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COMMENT
Interamerican Cooperation in Obtaining Testimony:
The Problems of Integrating Foreign Systems of Evidence:
A Comparative Study of the United States,
The Federal Republic of Germany, and Mexico*
MITCHELL M. COHEN **
AND
MARTHA L. HUTZELMAN***
The volume of international litigation has increased proportion-
ately with the increase of international commerce, travel, and poli-
tics. As international litigation has increased, however, so have re-
lated problems. A major difficulty is posed by the need to obtain oral
evidence from witnesses, including parties and experts, in a foreign
state for use in the domestic forum court. Faced with the problem of
taking evidence abroad under judicial systems different from their
own, many nations have adopted individual and collective laws.
This paper will consider the evidentiary problem as it is encoun-
tered in civil proceedings in the federal courts of three nations: the
United States, a common law nation; the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (Germany), a continental civil law nation; and Mexico, a Latin
American civil law nation. By comparing the United States, Ger-
many, and Mexico, not only will civil and common law countries be
contrasted, but differences between civil law nations will also be
noted. Only proceedings in which the judge is sitting without a jury
will be addressed, even though civil cases in the United States may be
tried before a jury. The role and problems of the judge in obtaining
evidence will be primarily considered in this paper. The United States'
pre-trial discovery process, which essentially involves litigants, will
not be discussed.
Additionally, the powers of the judge and the procedure for
obtaining the testimony of witnesses, parties, and experts to determine
the difficulties encountered by a judge requested to take testimony for
a foreign court will be examined. Recommendations will be suggested
for the major problems a judge faces in application: the failure to
appreciate conceptual differences of another system, the lack of tech-
• This paper received first prize of the Law Student Award of the Inter-Ameri-
can Bar Association at the XXII Conference held in Quito, Ecuador March 14-20,
1981.
• J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona College of Law.
J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona College of Law.
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nical knowledge of specific differences in rules, and the judge's own
reluctance to alter the status quo.
The European community, including as signatories the United
States and Germany, formed the Hague Convention on Taking Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. The Convention pro-
vides a standard procedure to gather evidence abroad by letters of
request (similar to letters rogatory), in which the forum court requests
the foreign court to use its jurisdictional powers to perform some
judicial act. The procedural laws followed will be those of the execut-
ing court, unless otherwise requested.' Requests will ordinarily be
made by forum courts to avoid receiving inadmissible and valueless
testimony. The executing court must follow the specified procedure
unless the act is incompatible with internal constitutional or legisla-
tive law or the performance is impossible due to practical difficulties
or a serious contradiction with internal practice (Article 9).2 The
Latin American community, including Mexico as a signatory, has
adopted much of the Hague Convention, including Article 9, into the
Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory.
The United States gives the court discretion to admit non-con-
forming evidence obtained in response to a letter rogatory for nations
with which it does not have a treaty.' The United States' Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure govern unless the request directs otherwise. 4
Where no treaty exists, both Mexico and Germany require letters
rogatory to be subject to their own procedural laws, regardless of any
request. Germany, however, will not compel a witness to appear and
testify for a letter rogatory if it has no treaty with the requesting
nation. 5
Conventions and statutes have solved the problem of reciprocity,
but each assumes that judges are able to apply the rules of another
system. These laws do nothing to ameliorate the problems faced in
their application.
1. Ulmer, Obtaining Testimony Outside the United States: Problem for the
California Practioner, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1237 (1978).
2. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DICTIONARY, SELECTED INTERNATIONAL CON-
VENTIONS, Conventions on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, 4556 (1981).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1970).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1970).
5. See Ulmer, supra note I, at 1239.
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I. PowER OF THE JUDGE
The United States judge' is primarily responsible for admitting
evidence throughout the litigation. Ordinarily, his decisions are made
during the pretrial conference with the parties' counsel and in trial at
a party's request. In accord with Rules 401 through 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, evidence must be relevant, meaning that it tends to
make the existence of a consequential proposition more probable or
less probable than that proposition would be without the evidence. 7
Evidence must also be reliable, thus excluding all rumor and hearsay
unless the exclusion is excepted under the rules. Exclusions for lack of
relevance and reliability are the only restrictions a judge can make of
proof and witnesses. The judge may additionally play a role in deter-
mining the issues for trial during the pre-trial conference.
The judge can call and (or) examine witnesses, but he is under no
duty to do so.8 The judge has the power to appoint and call to the
stand an impartial expert.9 United States' judges sometimes exercise
this power in cases where the opinions of the parties' experts are
conflicting.' 0 However, the primary responsibility for evidentiary
presentation always remains with the parties."
The court may ask supplementary questions at the presentation
of evidence or, as a rare exercise of power, call for the production of
evidence not offered by the parties. These are measures only used in
public interest cases or if there is a distinct disadvantage of one
party. 12
The parties "offer" proof by placing the witness on the stand and
asking questions. The court has reasonable control over the interroga-
tion subject to the opponent's appropriate objections. The lawyers
have interviewed the witness before the trial and have his written
statement at the trial. In theory, a judge may call a witness not
offered by either party and interrogate him even over protest of both
parties. 13
6. The authors refer primarily to proceedings involving federal district and
appellate court judges.
7. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 364 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as LILLY].
8. FED. R. EVID. 614, 706.
9. FED. R. Evir. 706.
10. See LILLY at 5 n.9.
11. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2484 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WICMORE].
12. Homburger, Functions of Orality in Austrian and American Civil Procedure,
20 BUFFALO L. REv. 31 (1970).
13. 3 WimorE § 784.
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide sanctions by which
the judge's powers are enforced. A party, witness, or expert who
refuses to obey a court order to appear at trial, to testify if privileged
information will not be revealed, and to produce documentary evi-
dence will be held in contempt of court and subject to fine or impris-
onment.1 4 A party is additionally subject to contempt if he refuses to
submit to a court-ordered physical or mental examination.' 5
In a German court, the judge's power stems as much from deter-
mining issues as from directly taking evidence. In the German civil
court procedure, the judge determines the factual issues of the case
from the oral arguments, outlines of issues and offers of proof pre-
sented by the parties. For the issues identified, the court makes an
order for proof-taking based on the offers of proof. These issues deter-
mine the relevancy of the evidence. There are no other extraneous
admissibility rules. The proof-order specifies the issues on which the
evidence is to be taken, witnesses and other proof used, and questions
to be asked of the witnesses.' The proof-order is not required before
testimony is taken, but is necessary before judgment.'" The proof-
taking, at which the testimony of witnesses is taken, follows to con-
sider the issues then identified. The witness' testimony is limited to the
issues specified in the proof-order.
A witness must be nominated by the parties to be called, but only
the court can call witnesses. The court alone has the power to choose
the type of nominated evidence, such as witnesses, and the number
and sequence of witnesses to be called to prove each issue.' The
judge can examine experts and parties or obtain an expert's written
opinion without a party nomination. 9
Generally, the court depends on the evidence offered by the
parties. It does not make its own investigation of evidence.20  The
judge does have the duty to ensure all statements and proof are made
which are necessary for the correct ascertainment of the facts in
issue, 2 and to this end will make recommendations to the parties.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 34, 45, 45 (f).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
16. ZPO 358.
17. Shartel, Burke & Wolff, Civil Justice in Germany, 42 MICHI1AN L. REV. 883
(1944).
18. ZPO 359.
19. ZPO 144, 272(b)II(5), 452.
20. ZPO 138.
21. See Homburger, supra note 12, at 25 and ZPO 139.
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However, the final allegations and offers of proof, including nomina-
tions of witnesses, are from the parties. Often a party will follow the
court's suggestion if it sees some advantage to itself.
In special situations, particularly domestic actions such as di-
vorce and actions involving the legal status of a party, the court has
the power of judicial investigation, in which the judge takes the
initiative in discovering the relevant facts. The court is not required to
accept as settled and unimpeachable factual allegations agreed be-
tween the parties or left undisputed by them. Unless objected to by
both parties, the court has the power in these special situations to call
witnesses not nominated by the parties. 22 In practice, the court
usually makes its suggestion to the parties, and allows them to decide
whether to offer the evidence. The court can further acquire evidence
by exercising its limited power to call for a party-hearing, party-testi-
mony given during oral argument in order to clarify issues and factual
information. 23
The German court has the responsibility to require witnesses to
appear and testify. If a witness refuses, he may be held liable for costs,
a money fine, or subject to detention for a maximum of six weeks.2 4
The witness also may be arrested and brought in by force, at the
discretion of the court.2 5
The court cannot require party-testimony as direct proof, but a
fine can be imposed on a party for failure to appear in response to a
party-hearing order. 28 Once he has appeared, a party can refuse to
speak. The court can, however, draw unfavorable inferences from the
party's refusal. 27 In practice, a party will rarely risk the success of his
suit by declining to cooperate. Thus, the lack of sanctions to compel
party-testimony are practically overcome. An expert refusing to ap-
pear or testify may only be subject to a money fine.28
In Mexico, the judge may play a direct role in obtaining evidence
throughout the trial. At the outset of the action, he must make an
initial determination of the admissibility of evidence offered by the
22. Kaplan, Von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71
HARV, L. REv. 1227 (1958).
23. ZPO 141, 148.
24. ZPO 390.
25. ZPO 380.
26. ZPO 141(111), 272(b)(IV).
27. ZPO 286.
28. ZPO 409.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
parties, in accord with Article 298 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
the Federal District and Territories. Evidence must be relevant factu-
ally and legally, and permitted procedurally. Evidence cannot be
submitted for an immoral purpose, such as provoking a scandal
against a party or third person. 2 The judge may restrict the amount
of proof or number of witnesses as he determines prudent. In the
Mexican system, evidence is in principle produced by the parties, but
Articles 278 and 279 give the court broad powers to obtain evidence
on its own.3" The use of these powers is discretionary. 3
Article 278 authorizes the judge to make use of any person, and
any thing or document necessary to know the truth about the points in
controversy. Article 279 authorizes the court to use or extend the use
of any method of fact-finding conducive to discovering the truth
about the points in controversy. Thus, the judge has great freedom to
manage the case as he deems best. He can delve deeper into evidence
presented by the parties, or call evidence the parties have not offered.
Unlike the parties, whose presentation of evidence may be restricted
to a specific probatory period, the judge is free to call evidence at any
time. 32
Although the use of the judge's powers is discretionary, it must be
impartial. Article 277 requires him to conduct the case without harm
to the rights of either party. The judge must listen to the parties and
procure evidence with all possible equanimity.
To ensure that the judge's powers are effective, the Mexican
Code of Civil Procedure provides sanctions. In regard to a litigating
party who refuses to obey a court order to submit to a physical or
mental examination, to answer questions, or to supply documents or
objects for inspection, Article 287 declares that the opposing party's
point will be taken as proven, absent proof to the contrary. Against
recalcitrant third persons, both witnesses and experts, Article 288
empowers the court to use the most effective means to compel the
production of evidence.
It is apparent that the civil and common law systems have differ-
ent conceptions of the role of the judge. This conceptual distinction
29. E. PALLARES, DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 406 (4th ed. 1971) and R. PALMA,
GuiA DE DERECHO PROCESAL CIVIL 306-07 (3d ed. 1972).
30. See E. PALLARES, supra note 29, at 354.
31. Tesis 1899 de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, Quinta 6poca, Tomo CXXVII
pdg. 687.
32. See R. PALMA, supra note 29, at 308.
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represents a practical problem when a judge in one system is asked to
take testimony using the methods of another system,
The United States judge is accustomed to working in a system in
which his role in obtaining witnesses is traditionally limited and well-
defined. For several reasons, he might have difficulty conducting
proof-taking by civil law rules. An ingrained notion of a judge's
function might hinder him from adapting to a new role. Fear of
jeopardizing his impartiality might make him reluctant to fully utilize
his powers, which are broad but not necessarily well defined in most
civil law jurisdictions. 33 The temptation to rely on party representa-
tives might deter the judge from actively injecting himself into proof-
taking.
In contrast, a German or Mexican judge asked to take testimony
for a United States court might feel constrained and ineffectual. The
restricted use of the judge's power to obtain evidence might appear
overly cautious to him, especially in light of two omissions of the
common law adversary system. First, the adversary theory takes no
account of the interest of each party in suppressing unfavorable evi-
dence. Second, it presupposes that the parties are equally matched in
resources and skill. 34 A German or Mexican judge would feel it was
his duty to get all relevant evidence before him, and to adjust as much
as possible inequalities in representation between the parties. It might
be difficult for him to understand that the common law views the trial
as an adversarial presentation rather than a tripartite investigation.
Between the courts of Mexico and Germany, of course, concep-
tual problems would be minimal. Nonetheless, a judge in one country
would have to be informed of the scope of his authority under the
laws of the other. As noted earlier, for example, a Mexican judge can
call evidence on his own initiative at any time, whereas a German
judge, except in extraordinary cases, can only call evidence with the
permission of both parties.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Hearsay evidence is excluded from admission into court in the
United States, 35 with the following exceptions: evidence of non-assert-
ive conduct, 36 prior statements by witnesses,37 statements offered for
33. See Homberger, supra note 12, at 29.
34. Id. at 34-35.
35. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(2).
36. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1).
37. FED. R. Evin. 801(C).
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other than their truth, 38 admissions by a party opponent, 39 and evi-
dence for which the hearsay declarant's availability is immaterial.4"
Under the adversary system, the purpose for the hearsay exclu-
sionary rule is to allow each party a fair chance to challenge the
reliability of the other's proof. Hearsay evidence may be plausible,
but it cannot be tested adequately by the opponent's cross-examina-
tion.
A secondary purpose for the hearsay rule is to exclude evidentiary
materials that present a substantial risk of misuse by the jury.4 '
Currently, in trials held before a judge sitting without a jury, the
trend is to admit evidence that might be rejected in a jury trial on the
assumption the judge can appropriately weigh the evidence. 42
Hearsay evidence is freely received and freely evaluated by the
German judge in order to ascertain the truth without regard to techni-
cal rules. 43
There is no exclusion of witnesses stating what they heard others
say, nor is there any restriction on the probative weight to be attrib-
uted to their testimony. 44 The court's emphasis is on determining the
source from which a witness derived his knowledge. 45  Whenever
practical, the original declarant of a statement is called. 46 The goal
of the procedure is to assure the immediacy and orality of the final
hearing. 47 The protection of the judgment from distortion by hearsay
is the judge's interrogation itself, at which the judge has the responsi-
bility to uncover weaknesses and inconsistencies of the evidence.4" In
his evaluation, the judge does consider the inferior nature of deriva-
tive evidence.
Like Germany, Mexico relies on the judge to evaluate less reliable
evidence, rather than instituting strict rules to exclude such evidence.
Thus, hearsay is admissible. The distinction is still made, however,
between a testigo de oidas, a witness whose knowledge comes from
38. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
39. FED. R. EVID. 803.
40. FED. R. EVID. 803.
41. See LILLY at 4.
42. Id. at 3 n.4.
43. ZPO 286.
44. Hammelman, Hearsay Evidence: A Comparison, 67 L.Q. REv. 69 (1951).
45. ZPO 396(111).
46. See Hammelman, supra note 44, at 76.
47. Id. at 76.
48. Id. at 78.
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others, and a testigo ocular, a direct or eyewitness.49 Further, Article
369 requires the witness to inform the court of the circumstances
behind this testimony. The witness thus has a legal obligation to alert
the court as to whether the source of his testimony is direct or indi-
rect.50 In evaluating evidence, the judge will usually discount the
value of hearsay testimony.
Not all exclusionary rules in the United States are based on the
need to bar unreliable evidence from trial. The use of certain evi-
dence, even if reliable, is inimical to principles or relationships which
the law seeks to preserve.," For example, spouses cannot be com-
pelled to reveal their confidential communications on the ground that
marital intimacy should be encouraged, and, alternatively, that cer-
tain aspects of private life should be free from public disclosure .52
Certain professional-client relationships, such as those between attor-
ney and client, physician and patient, clergyman and penitent, and
journalist and source, may be protected to promote full and candid
disclosure by the client.5 3 Government officials cannot be compelled
to reveal state secrets if disclosure might endanger national security or
foreign relations. Communications between high level government
officials may be privileged in order to encourage frank discussion
among those responsible for executive decisions.-" Under the princi-
ple established by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, persons cannot be compelled to give testimony which
might be used against them in a criminal action. 5
German courts permit persons to refuse to testify without reason
based on their relationships, including a party's spouse or his near
relative by blood, marriage, or adoption. Such persons may refuse
even if the party is willing for them to testify. Privileges, like those in
the United States, also extend to professional-client relationships and
public officials. 56 To protect the court from the possibility of a wit-
ness committing perjury to protect himself, resulting in unreliable
testimony,57 in a broad privilege against self-incrimination, a witness
49. See E. PALLARES, supra note 29, at 405.
50. Id. at 409.
51. See LILLY at 317.
52. Id. at 320-21.
53. Id. at 328-30, 357-58.
54. Id. at 358-59.
55. Id. at 336-38.
56. ZPO 376, 383, 385.
57. Pieck, Witness Privilege Against SelJ-Incrimination in the Civil Law, 5 VILL.
L. REv. 381 (1960).
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may refuse to answer a question which would dishonor, risk criminal
prosecution of, or cause direct pecuniary loss to himself, his spouse, or
a near relative, or cause him to reveal trade secrets. 5s With all
privileges, a court need not advise the witness of his privilege, but
apprisal is often given. 59 Inferences may be drawn by the court from
a privileged refusal to testify. Incriminating statements a witness
makes which are included in the judicial report may be used in a
subsequent criminal proceeding against him. 0
Mexico, like the United States and Germany, recognizes circum-
stances in which persons should not be compelled to give testimony.
Article 288 lists these circumstances as two broad exceptions to the
general obligation upon persons having knowledge of the facts in
dispute to testify at trial. The first exception excludes close relatives of
a party, specifically ascendants, descendants, and spouses from the
duty to give testimony. The second exception exempts those persons
who guard a party's confidences as the result of a professional rela-
tionship. In either case, the privilege exists only where proof is sought
against the party to whom they are related. Public authorities are
privileged in a roundabout way under Article 326. They may submit
written answers rather than appear directly before the court. Failure
to reply or to reply adequately does not result in actions against the
official; the point in question is simply deemed admitted. The Code of
Civil Procedure does not mention a privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in civil trials.
Admissibility of evidence may be further limited by the exclusion
of incompetent witnesses. In the United States, a witness is usually
declared incompetent to testify to prevent inaccurate or perjured
testimony. The witness is disqualified, under the common law lack of
relevancy test, only when he is shown to be incapable of perceiving,
remembering, or describing the event in question or when he is
deemed unable to appreciate his duty to testify truthfully. 6' The test
is usually applied where the witness is extremely young or suffers from
a particular type or degree of mental illness. Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, a witness is disqualified only if he is found to lack
personal knowledge of the matter about which he testifies, 62 or if he
fails to declare by oath or affirmation that he will testify truthfully.6 3
58. ZPO 384.
59. See Pieck, supra note 57, at 381.
60. Id. at 403.
61. See LILLY at 65.
62. FED. R. EVID. 602.
63. FED. R. EvuD. 603.
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In the German court an individual is competent to be a witness if
he is not a party, a party's representative in court, or the presiding
judge.6 4 The party's legal representative remains incompetent to tes-
tify even if all information has been admitted to court through the
party-interrogation and he has nothing to protect.6 5
Under present Mexican law, there is no category of incompetent
witnesses.66  Instead, Mexico relies on the parties to object to the
testimony of unreliable witnesses, and the court to consider all cir-
cumstances in its evaluation of such testimony. Under Article 363, a
witness must tell the court of certain grounds for objections to his
reliability, such as a close relation to one of the parties or an interest in
the matter being litigated. If he does not mention a ground, the
opposing party may introduce it on his own motion, according to
Article 371. Objections are made solely to inject doubt into the testi-
mony of a witness. To invalidate evidence completely as false testi-
mony, contradictory evidence must be rendered against it.67
Under the common law approach, unreliable evidence that can-
not be tested must not be presented to the judge. In contrast, the civil
law theory holds that the judge should be able to freely evaluate all
evidence without procedural interference. Accordingly, more specific
admissibility rules exist under the common law than the civil law.
Ignorance of the conceptual and specific technical differences in rules
creates a practical problem for the judge of one system who is asked to
take testimony applying the procedure of another system.
The United States judge is handicapped by the lack of specific
rules in civil law jurisdictions on questioning of witnesses to determine
the reliability of testimony. The problem is diminished by two factors:
first, a growing similarity in common and civil law concepts of relia-
bility as the trend to admit hearsay in United States courts continues,
and, second, the judge's own experience as trial counsel. An unre-
solved issue is whether the judge is required to call the original declar-
ant of hearsay evidence to replace the requested witness.
Mexican and German judges using United States' procedure need
to know the specific exclusionary rules and exceptions that they must
enforce. They will be unable to rule rapidly during testimony and
cross-examination since determining what is admissible is not intuitive
64. ZPO 373(2).
65. ZPO 373(2)(B).
66. See E. PALLARES, supra note 29 at 403, and R. PALMA, supra note 29 at 382.
67. See R. PALMA, supra note 29 at 390.
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to them. Additionally, the judges will have difficulty in interpreting
and applying the United States' general rules on competency without
more specific instructions. The United States judge can relate the
Mexican judge's discretionary power in determining competency to
his own concerning impeachment of witnesses. Similar privileges are
recognized in all three countries, and are not problematic, except for
the notably broader German self-incrimination privilege.
III. TAKING OF TESTIMONY
A. Ordinary Witnesses
The production of testimonial evidence in the United States is
controlled largely by the parties. Although the court may theoretically
call witnesses on its own, they are usually summoned upon request
from the parties. Party attorneys may prepare witnesses for trial, and
even rehearse their testimony. Interrogation originates with one of the
parties, and opposing counsel retains the right to cross-examina-
tion.6 The reason that the parties are given such a dominant role is
that in the United States the taking of evidence is conceived as an
adversary process. Questioning is put largely in the hands of the
parties, who, it is assumed, will make every effort to bring all the facts
favorable to their side to the attention of the court. Similarly, cross-ex-
amination allows an opposing party to vigorously test the accuracy,
completeness, and credibility of an opposing witness' testimony. 69
Under the common law, the United States court does have the
power to ask questions at any stage of proof-taking and to require,
when appropriate, testimony by free narrative in preference to spe-
cific questions on direct examination by the party who produced the
witness.70 The judge is also assumed to have the power to interrogate
witnesses called by either himself or a party, but in practice this
power is used sparingly. 7 In addition, the witness is entitled to the
court's protection if he is unduly harassed or exposed to unfair tac-
tics.7 2
In Germany, parties can nominate witnesses, but only the court
can choose and call them. Once the witness is admitted, he is the
court's witness. Thus, a party is not bound by the testimony of a
68. See Homburger, supra note 12, at 34-35.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 37, and FEm. R. EVID. 611.
71. Id. at 37.
72. Id. at 35.
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witness whom he has nominated. The witness is not interrogated, nor
prepared prior to giving testimony, as immediacy and spontaneity is
desired. Offers of witnesses must be tied to proof of a specific allega-
tion of fact. It is insufficient to state that the witness has something to
contribute to the case. 3
The witness is excluded from the courtroom until he is to testify74
but this exclusion does not apply to experts, The court first admon-
ishes the witness of his obligation to tell the truth, and refers to the
criminal penalties imposed for false sworn and unsworn testimony
and to the fact that an oath may be requested of him when his
testimony is concluded. 75 Only if the judge deems it advisable is a
witness required to take an oath.Thoughout the testimony, the wit-
ness is reminded of his obligation to tell the truth. This procedure
gives the witness the opportunity to change his testimony before he is
sworn. In any event, the oath-taking ceremony is used infrequently.
Witnesses are examined by the presiding judge. Counsel some-
times suggests questions to be asked. Upon demand, the judge must
allow counsel to put questions to the witness directly, 76 a rule which
also applies to experts. Usually, there is little questioning by counsel or
the parties. When done, it is more often direct than through the
court. 
77
The proof order will specify the issue on which the witness is to
testify.78 Once testimony begins, the questioning can go beyond the
stated issue to correct or enlarge upon it. A new issue cannot, how-
ever, be introduced without the agreement of both parties in oral-
argument. 79  The proof-taking can be interrupted in order to amend
the proof-order or to call a new witness discovered from the proof-tak-
73. See Kaplan, supra note 22, at 1217.
74. ZPO 394.
75. ZPO 392, 395.
76. ZPO 397.
77. See Kaplan, supra note 22, at 1235.
78. ZPO 359, 377.
79. The oral argument, a stage separate from the proof-taking, is designed to
shape the issues and content of the case, and to clarify allegations, proof-offers, and
matters discovered from proof-takings. See generally Kaplan, supra note 22. Since no
jury is present in civil trials, it is a collaborative discussion between the court, parties,
and counsel, at which the parties play an active part and may be heard on request.
ZPO 137(IV). The judge has a duty to ask questions of the parties to clarify the issues
and claims. The parties, however do not have to answer. See Homburger, supra note
12, at 26. Proof-taking itself is often interrupted by the court directing such questions
to counsel and the parties. Counsel is present to protect the party from any violation
of procedure or oppressive conduct by the judge or opponent.
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ing. The proof-taking can then resume. Since the questioning of a
witness is limited to one stated issue, a party has no opportunity to
discover further evidence, except through a loosely phrased or en-
forced proof-order, an unexpected witness statement, or clarification
at oral argument.
The witness is first told what the court desires to know, and is
allowed to reply with a narrative story in his own words, without
undue interruption."0 His statement is then followed by questions to
clarify, test, and amplify his story. There is no direct or cross-exami-
nation as in the United States. Questioning may begin at once if the
court already has the basic facts. The taking of proof may be done in
installments over several days. If one witness contradicts another, the
court may order confrontation, 8 ' a rule also applicable to experts.
No verbatim report is made. Ordinarily, the judge dictates to the
reporter a brief statement of the witness' testimony. The statement is
then read back to the witness for his correction and approval. With
the court's permission, an ordinary witness can submit a written
statement in lieu of appearing in person, when his testimony will
probably involve reference to books and records, or in other situations
if the parties agree.
In Mexico, the judge and parties share in taking testimony. The
parties usually nominate witnesses, but the judge may call his own
under the broad powers granted him by Article 278.82 Attorneys may
prepare witnesses for trial, since the Code of Civil Procedure does not
prohibit the practice. 3  In order to retain some spontaneity in a
witness' response to questioning, Article 364 forbids a witness who has
been interrogated from having any relation with witnesses about to be
examined.
Before a witness may testify, Article 363 requires the witness to
affirm that he will tell the truth. The judge is required to warn the
witness of the penalties for false testimony.
Interrogation is conducted primarily by the parties. The party
presenting the witness questions him first. Article 361 requires that
questioning take place in the presence of opposing counsel. When
direct examination ends, the witness submits to cross-examination by
80. ZPO 396.
81. ZPO 394.
82. See E. PALLARM, supra note 29, at 410.
83. Id.
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the opposing party, a procedure called la repugna.84 The judge is
present to assure that the interrogation is fair. Under Article 360, he
may strike all questions which violate the law, which are submitted
for an immoral purpose, or are unclear or overly broad. The judge
may also question witnesses under Article 366, usually after the par-
ties have finished direct and cross-examination. 5
B. Parties
United States courts no longer make a distinction between in-
court testimony given by a witness and that of a party in litigation.
Party testimony is subject to no special evidentiary rules at trial.
German courts consider party testimony intrinsically unreliable,
because it is colored by self-interest.86 Separate rules thus distinguish
testimony of a party from that of a witness. A party is broadly defined
to include the legal representatives of parties lacking capacity to
appear in court for themselves, such as juristic persons and those
natural persons who are underage or who suffer from various physical
or psychological disabilities. 87
A party may, however, offer himself to testify on an issue. If the
opposing party consents, the court may, but is not required, to hear
the party testimony. Only if the party has the burden proof on an issue
may he propose that his opponent be called to testify on that issue.
The court will call the opponent if, after hearing all other evidence on
the issue, the truth still remains in doubt. 8  If a similar condition of
doubt remains on an issue after all other evidence is heard, the court
on its own motion may call one or both of the parties, regardless of
where the burden lies.89 In all situations, testimony is limited to the
issue stated in the proof-order. Party testimony is considered a last
resort. It is subject to a special rule which requires in all cases that it is
to be ordered only by a formal proof-order. 90
The court also has a limited inquisitorial power to call for a
party-hearing to clarify ambiguities in the case." Technically, the
84, C. LARA, TEOmuA GENERAL DE PROCEso 277 (1st ed. 1974).
85. See E. PALLARES, supra note 29, at 407-08.
86. See Kaplan, supra note 22, at 1242.
87. ZPO 455; See Kaplan, supra note 22, at 1241.
88. ZPO 445.
89. ZPO 448.
90. ZPO 450.
91. ZPO 448.
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information gathered is available only for background, but practically
it will also affect the ultimate judgment."2
For both a party-hearing and party-testimony, the party is sub-
ject to a fine for failure to appear,"3 but once he appears, a party can
refuse to answer a particular question or refuse to testify at all.
Refusal to answer, however, may properly result in unfavorable infer-
ences made by the court in its final consideration. 4
The parties have a duty to be complete and truthful when declar-
ing factual circumstances. 95 Like a witness, a party is criminally
liable for giving false testimony under oath, whether intentionally or
negligently.9 A party intentionally giving false unsworn testimony is
subject to punishment for the offense of fraud. 97  The oath-taking
may be requested, but in practice there is particular reluctance to
require it of a party.
Mexico, like Germany, deems party statements inherently unreli-
able. Rules governing the admission of party statements are more
strict than those governing the statements of witnesses. Party testi-
mony also only has probative force if it is to the prejudice of the party
making it. 98 In addition, there is a second reason that Mexico distin-
guishes party statements. The Mexican method of taking party testi-
mony originated historically not as a method of adducing proof, but
as a means of defining the positions of the litigating parties. 99 Since
the aim of the party confession was to define the issues, both questions
and responses had to be as concrete and specific as possible.
Articles 317 and 318 allow both the court and the opponent to
question a party. A party may be either a litigant or the attorney of a
litigant who is authorized to answer for him. Interrogation is con-
ducted through a formal type of question called a posici6n, described
in Article 311. The subject of a posici6n is limited to the acts of the
party confessing. Each posici6n must not encompass more than a
single fact. It must be formulated such that the confessing party can
answer it with a simple yes or no. 00 A posicidn cannot be insidious;
92. See Kaplan, supra note 22, at 1226.
93. ZPO 272(b)(IV).
94. ZPO 286, 446, 453.
95. ZPO 138.
96. STGB 154, 163.
97. STGB 263.
98. Tesis 775 de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, Boletin 1961, pig. 394.
99. See R. PALMA, supra note 29, at 332.
100. See C. LARA, supra note 84, at 274-75.
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in other words, it cannot be designed to confuse the respondent with
the intent of tricking him into a false confession.
Under Articles 308 and 309, every litigant is obligated to submit
to interrogation upon court order. Failure to respond to a posicidn is
deemed an admission, unless rebutted. Article 315 bars a respondent
from receiving assistance from his attorney or any person other than
an interpreter in formulating his answer. The answer must be a
categoric affirmative or negative, together with whatever explanation
is convenient or asked for by the court. Under Articles 316 and 322,
failure to give a definite answer will be presumed to be a confession of
the facts asserted in the posici6n.
Although the rules governing the taking of party testimony are
strict, once made, a party statement is complete proof under Article
496. In contrast, witness and expert testimony are governed by less
stringent rules, but their probative value is subject to free evaluation
by the court.
C. Experts
In the United States, the court has the opportunity to choose the
most qualified and fit experts. As the court must depend on experts for
technical advice but is little able to assess the value of their opinion,
the expert must be impartial and unbiased.' 0 ' Since experts must give
opinions and conclusions to statements, they are exempt from the
Opinion Rule, which excludes opinion, inference, and belief from the
testimony of ordinary witnesses.102
Experts in the United States are usually chosen and paid for by
the parties. There is no qualification floor imposed on experts, and
there is a tendency for experts to support the party presenting and
paying them. 0 3 This often results in contradictory evidence. Even if
an expert tries to be impartial, he is frequently forced into a partisan
position when his authority is challenged during cross-examina-
tion.0 4 If the expert evidence is so confused that the court cannot
decide the issue without summoning technical assistance, it may de-
cide that the point is not proven and the loss will fall on the party
which bears the burden of proof on that issue. ' 05
101. Hammelman, Expert Evidence, 10 MOD. L. REv. 33 (1947).
102. Id. at 33 n.3.
103. Id. at 34.
104. Id. at 34 n.4.
105. Id. at 35.
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There is a trend in the United States for the court to call its own
expert to give impartial technical assistance. In this role, the expert
does not have a judicial function, but remains a source of evidence as
to the facts."" The expert gives advice to the judge, who is not bound
to take the advice. The court has the inherent power to call its own
experts. 107 The expert may be agreed upon by the parties or selected
by the court. Costs are to be shared as the court directs.I s This rule is
in no way to infringe on the parties' ability to call their own experts.
Courts are reluctant, however, to call their own experts for fear
that calling an expert might be construed by the jury as an espousal of
one party's cause over the other's."I Experts are also infrequently
used due to indecision as to the allotment of costs, the lack of master
lists from which to select qualified and impartial experts, and the
absence of established circumstances in which a court should appoint
an expert."10
In Germany, experts assist the court in finding facts or drawing
conclusions from given facts based on their special studies or experi-
ence beyond the range of the tribunal. Experts are not regarded as
witnesses nor as instruments of proof. They are assistants to the tribu-
nal and non-partisan. The court, not the parties, has the responsibility
to determine whether an expert witness is to be called. The court will
act on the advice of the parties, but ultimately decides himself
whether to call an expert and how many to call. Each court maintains
a list of publicly accredited experts drawn up by professional associa-
tions for different types of matters likely to come before it. It is from
this list that court experts are selected and appointed."' A party may
nominate an expert, but the court is entitled to reject his choice and
select another expert." 2 A party may choose anyone as his expert,
but usually chooses one who is eminent or has special qualifications.
When the parties agree upon one expert, the court cannot refuse to
hear him. The court can, however, call an additional expert if it finds
the agreed expert's opinion to be insufficient.t13 A party may file the
106. Id.
107. Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1962).
108. FED. R. EVID. 706.
109. Basten, The Court Expert in Civil Trials-A Comparative Appraisal, 40
MOD. L. REV. 183 (1977).
110. Id. at 184.
111. See Hammelman, supra note 101 at 37 n.14.
112. ZPO 404.
113. ZPO 404, 412.
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report of an expert he has retained and paid, but such reports are
treated circumspectly by the courts, like the party's initial written
statement." 4 Experts can be challenged by a party in the same way
judges are challenged, i.e., based on conflict of interest, relationship
to the parties, or bias.115
While investigating, experts can question parties and their coun-
sel and call third persons. An expert will usually submit a written
opinion in advance; he will then reappear and be questioned on it. A
written opinion alone may be submitted. Even so, a party can still
require that the expert appear before the court.1 6  If insufficient
evidence is obtained, the court can appoint new experts to furnish
another report, regardless of the parties' wishes." 7
In contrast to the practice in the United States, there is no
complaint about the bias of experts in German courts. The judges
most often complain that the experts do not offer quality assistance.
This problem is probably due to the German tendency to call experts
when they are really not necessary.
Like a witness, the expert is criminally punishable for giving false
testimony under oath, whether intentionally or negligently. "8 He is
also subject to a criminal penalty for intentionally giving false un-
sworn testimony. 19
Mexico considers an expert as an auxiliary of the judge, or as a
technical consultant.120 Expert opinions give the judge technical ori-
entation, but they are never binding on him.' 2' The production of
expert evidence is not adversarial in the traditional common law
sense, but the parties still play an important role. Under Article 347, a
single expert may render an opinion if the parties agree upon his
nomination. If, as usually happens, the parties cannot agree, then
114. See Kaplan, supra note 22, at 1243.
115. ZPO 406.
116. ZPO 411, 402, 397.
117. See Hammelman, supra note 101 at 38.
118. STGB 154, 163.
119. STGB 153.
120. Tesis 1692 de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, Suplemento de 1956, pig. 354.
121. Jurisprudencia 1693 de la Suprema Corte de Justicia; Porfirio Guzmin
Arenas, Volumen XVIII, pig. 103; Ernesto Alfonso Guerro y Ferndndez de Arcipes-
tre, Volumen XXVII, pig. 95; Luis Castillo L6pez, Volumen XXXIV, pig. 53;
Ismael Bucio Bucio, Volumen XLIII, pig. 76; Librorio Mata Torres, Volumen LIII,
pig. 54.
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each party nominates its own expert and the court nominates a third,
called a tercero en discordia.12
A party is free to nominate anyone he chooses as an expert,
provided the person has a legal title in the area of the controversy,
unless a legally titled expert does not exist in the field or is not
available. Experts nominated by the court must be Mexican citizens,
and must be chosen from the official list compiled by the Supreme
Court.123 Under Article 351, an expert can decline appointment if he
is related by blood to one of the parties, has an interest in the matter
being litigated, or has social or business ties with one of the parties.
Experts who testify are paid by the party who presented them. Article
354 requires litigants to share the cost of the court expert without
regard to the disposition of the case.
Article 349 gives the parties the right to question experts, but
Article 350 states that the experts will ultimately discuss the case
alone. If the experts nominated by the parties agree in their opinion,
only their opinion will be submitted to the court. If they disagree, the
tercero en discordia will express his opinion.
D. Analysis
It is evident that conceptual and practical differences in the
taking of testimony abound, thus presenting judges in each country
with a variety of problems. An initial difficulty is whether to distin-
guish between types of witnesses, particularly between parties and
ordinary witnesses. While civil law jurisdictions deem parties more
unreliable than ordinary witnesses, common law jurisdictions do not.
Even between civil law countries, however, there are practical differ-
ences in approach. For example, both Mexico and Germany apply
stringent rules to the taking of party testimony, while Germany also
limits the circumstances under which it may be taken.
Whether the judge should allow attorney preparation of persons
giving testimony is a further difficulty. Under the common law, pre-
sentation of evidence is adversarial; therefore attorneys are permitted
to prepare both witnesses and parties with an eye towards giving the
most effective testimony. Civil law countries differ greatly, even from
each other. Germany allows absolutely no preparation, for two rea-
sons: first, witnesses do not represent the parties, and second, wit-
122. See E. PALLAES, supra note 29, at 398-99.
123. Id.
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nesses should make spontaneous statements for the benefit of the
court.1 4 Mexico, on the other hand, allows attorneys preparation of
ordinary witnesses but not parties. In Germany, proof-taking is done
in installments, giving the parties time to reflect on and pursue evi-
dence which they may then submit to the court. Advance preparation
is less important than in the United States or Mexico, where presenta-
tion of evidence is concentrated and there is little time to reflect on
evidence of call back witnesses.
Another difficulty concerns the oath administered to witnesses in
the United States. The United States judge applying Mexican or Ger-
man procedure might be uneasy taking testimony from persons not
under oath. Actually, this problem is more apparent than real. Both
German and Mexican courts warn persons of the penalties for false
testimony, and have other safeguards to compel persons to speak
truthfully.
Cross-examination, or the lack of it, presents another problem.
The United States judge should have little trouble working under
Mexican procedure, which provides for cross-examination. Germany,
however, has no procedure for cross-examination. In order to assure
the accuracy of testimony, the judge must take an active part in
questioning. The United States judge may be unwilling to do so, out
of reluctance to break with his traditionally passive role and fear of
jeopardizing his impartiality.
For similar reasons, the United States judge may find it difficult
to call his own expert witness. It is easier for him to let the parties
present their own experts and for him to treat them as any other
witness. There is strong justification, however, for making a distinc-
tion between experts and other witnesses. Ordinary witnesses are
chosen by circumstance. Their personal observations cannot be substi-
tuted. There is good reason to view their testimony skeptically, and to
submit it to all the rigors of the adversarial process. Experts, on the
other hand, can be chosen based on how qualified they are to give
testimony.
The danger of an adversarial presentation is that the judge may
be swayed by the most persuasive expert, rather than the most solidly
based opinion.12. Since there is less need for an adversarial presenta-
tion in the case of an expert than an ordinary witness, it might be
124. See Homburger, supra note 12, at 32-34.
125. See Harnmelman, supra note 101, at 32-34.
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better for an expert to act as a technical advisor to the court, working
to inform the judge rather than to persuade him. This approach is
taken by both Germany and MexicoThe problem with this approach
is that the judge may accept the expert opinion at face value, rather
than subjecting it to the critical evaluation which even apparently
impartial opinions merit.
26
IV. CONCLUSION
The difficulties encountered by a judge asked to take testimony
under the procedures of another system can be divided into three
categories: (1) the failure to appreciate conceptual differences of the
other system; (2) the lack of technical knowledge of specific differ-
ences in rules; and (3) the judge's own reluctance to alter the status
quo. It is suggested that the following recommendations will alleviate
the problems presented by each category:
A. The executing judge might authorize an expert on the law of
the foreign forum court to carry out the request. The presence of the
expert eliminates both the conceptual and lack-of-knowledge prob-
lems, This approach may be advantageous to the foreign court be-
cause someone familiar with its systems would be involved with the
case. The executing court could not act, however, if an expert was
unavailable. The court's dependency on experts would allow it no
on-going capacity to deal with requests.
B. The requesting judge could be required to submit clear, well-
drafted, specific instructions and issues in his letter of request to
inform the executing judge of the purpose and use of the evidence to
be taken. Such information would alleviate problems stemming from
ignorance of specific rules and practices, although conceptual miscon-
ceptions might still exist. The specific instructions should not leave to
the executing judge's discretion the decision whether to exclude evi-
dence, thus protecting the witness' interest and admissibility to the
forum court. The stated issues allow the executing judge to follow up
on unexpected information gained from the testimony. A resulting
problem may be incorrect interpretations by the executing judge of
the specific instructions and issues given. The risk of this possibility,
however, could be greatly reduced by unambiguous drafting.
C. The requesting judge might ask for a verbatim transcript of
the testimony to eliminate the risk of irremedial errors, should the
126. Id. at 38-39.
COMMENT: INTERAMERICAN COOPERATION
executing judge misapply the procedural rules. Removing the execut-
ing judge from ruling on the testimony eliminates all three categories
of the problem. This approach is advantageous in that the executing
judge does not have to make an evaluation using an unfamiliar sys-
tem. The requesting judge would still have difficulty evaluating the
testimony after the fact of its occurrence and without having the
opportunity to see the witness make the statements. Further, the
requesting judge would be unable to ask follow-up questions regard-
ing inadmissible evidence or to depend on the executing judge to do
so. Conceptual problems may also still exist for the executing judge
while conducting the interrogation of the witness. From a public
policy standpoint, this approach would be disadvantageous since it
would not educate the executing judge in the taking of testimony
under letters rogatory or in the use of a foreign procedure.
D. The requesting court could liberally rule to permit the inclu-
sion of all evidence taken abroad to present in its forum. The elimina-
tion of all admissibility rules would reduce the magnitude of the
lack-of-knowledge problem. Such a system, however, would require a
United States judge to make a rigorous evaluation of the reliability of
such evidence, a burden usually sustained by rules of exclusion. Since
this approach only affects the admissibility of evidence, its effective-
ness overall in eliminating the difficulties of application would be very
limited.
E. The executing judge could use similarities between his system
and that of the foreign court to help him bridge the conceptual gap
between systems and more easily relate to the foreign system. By
applying methods the judge knows, this approach eliminates the con-
ceptual problem. Nevertheless, the judge might not always recognize
parallels between the laws of the foreign and executing courts. In
addition, there is the danger the judge will see similarities which do
not actually exist. Finally, success of this approach can only be as
complete as the congruence between systems.
F. Each nation involved in international litigations could create a
government-supported central staff to provide information and assist-
ance on foreign procedure to all courts upon request. This approach
would eliminate the conceptual and lack-of-knowledge problem and
might alleviate the reluctance problem through continuing education
of judges. This staff would benefit both requesting and executing
judges who need to know the laws of the country with which they
were dealing. Continuity of information would also be assured. A
potential problem would be the difficulty of acquiring government
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support. Cooperation among private institutions and universities
could, however, achieve the same result, with sufficient impetus.
The adoption of any or all of these recommendations offers the
possibility of providing a more flexible and productive basis for Inter-
American and international cooperation in obtaining testimony.
